New Update! Monday 19 November 2018

After Friday’s dramatic cabinet session, which saw a third Brexit Secretary, Dominic Raab and Work & Pensions Secretary Esther McVeigh resign, there are several possible options on the table:
1)      The deal might still go through parliament. Although divisions in the conservative party are high and it is unlikely that other parties would vote for the deal or to support Ms. May, backroom deals have often yielded surprising results during votes. The probability of that happening is now about even (50%), although Michael Gove’s implicity support could slow Brexiter momentum within the Tory party.

2)      Change of PM by vote of no confidence in the conservative party: A vote is increasingly likely after Jacob Rees-Mogg ‘s move to ask for a no confidence vote. It would require over 165 MPs to support Ms. May’s ouster, significantly above the 48 required to trigger the vote. If Ms. May survives this –and she probably would- she would be in a stronger position within her own party, but it still does not shield her from a parliamentary No Confidence vote, whose outcome depends on the DUP.

3)      Change of government by No Confidence vote: If the DUP or a few conservative MPs don’t support the government in a No Confidence vote, then the government falls. The key here is the 14-day rule. If the government cannot secure support within 14 days only then is the election called. This scenario is popular with Brexiters who believe they can trigger the process to cause the government to fall with significantly less than 165 votes, replace Ms May within 14 days and then garner party support to win parliamentary confidence, including resurrecting the deal with the DUP. This outcome is currently unlikely and chances are that a No Confidence vote would eventually lead to a new general election.

4)      Go back to the table and renegotiate: The problem with this approach is that the No-Deal option would hurt the UK more than it would hurt Europe, especially given the looming deadline for Brexit. The UK’s sole card, the refusal to disburse the £39B Brexit Bill could have serious legal implications, since this is money already agreed and signed for in previous treaties.

5)      Second Referendum: Although a sensible option which would also probably stop the Brexit clock, it is politically unpalatable, as there’s no significant support for this from any side of the aisle.  Currently we see little probability of that happening, but as negotiations continue and some initial faulty premises of Brexit are exposed (£350m per week for the NHS, full access to the EU markets while maintaining border control, an EU eager to offer a deal, the sheer complexity of the divorce, the Irish border problem), the need to revert back to the electorate may become more apparent.
Brexit is ideologically driven by a limited number of MPs, which is why it is difficult to assign an accurate probability to any particular outcome. Dominic Raab’s acceptance of the Brexit Minister post, and his subsequent resignation only a few weeks after, indicate that Tory stakeholders might be more focused on grabbing the spotlight instead of tackling the issue. So, in a field of so many options, we will not attempt to forecast. Instead we will focus on investors and the economy.
Investors are looking for clarity, a condition from which the UK is rapidly removing itself from. An unstable and partisan political climate, the threat of nationalisations under a different government and a slowing economy do not make for a compelling investment case.
Even if -somehow- Brexit was stopped in its tracks by a second referendum, Britain would face the prospect of a diminished status within the EU where it would probably lose the ability to appoint a Finance Commissioner to cater to the City’s needs and would certainly lose veto power over future EU integration. Under that regime it would have to renegotiate rebates as well as caps on benefits for migrants. The need to diversify its economy away from financial services, would not disappear as Frankfurt and Paris are already gearing up to challenge London for financial dominance.
The best case for the economy, partisan politics and financial markets would probably be the “Long Brexit”, a 10-year process during which UK politicians would have the time to reconfigure their economy and lay the groundwork for trade deals, which on average take more than3-5 years to negotiate anyway. Before triggering Article 50, the UK government had the power to force such an outcome. Now it is the EU’s to give, and it will probably not come cheap.  ​

Update: Thursday 15 November 2018

Yesterday’s initial Brexit deal is a small step in a long road towards a post-Brexit Britain. The deal proposal addressed two easy issues, the settlement of Britain’s exit bill to the EU, and the regulation of citizens’ rights on both sides. It also provided a compromise on a difficult one, the Irish border, one that would let the UK keep its territorial integrity and avoid a hard border in Ireland, but also provide the EU with a guarantee it needed it would not unilaterally renege on the deal. For the deal -seen by some MPs as a capitulation- to gain any momentum, it needs to clear a very divided parliament.

What does this mean for investors? For the moment, very little. If the parliamentary hurdle is cleared, a prerequisite for a Brexit “transition period” until January 2021, it would be positive over the shorter term, as it extends the current period of stability for two years. Currently, we believe the chances of not passing are even, especially after the resignation of newly appointed Brexit minister Dominic Raab.

Passing of the bill would also put the train on its tracks towards an amicable negotiation on what the future trade relationship with the EU looks like. The deal, however is a milestone, not a solution. It does not address the main issue for investors, which is clarity on what post-Brexit Britain looks like. As far as the City is concerned, the document  proposes access under the so-called “equivalence” regime, a system that lets firms from non-EU countries deemed to have similar financial regulations do business with the bloc. It is less than the benefits of full membership and subject to Brussels’ interpretation. The document also does nothing to reduce the increasing polarisation in the country and parliament , which is already constraining policy decisions and -ultimately- slowing the economy. As long as this is the case, we don’t expect global portfolios to increase their long-term position in British domestic assets.